A Somali male sits back and smokes Aug. 31, 1993, as a U.S. Soldier guards the front gate of a garage that was being searched for arms. (Alexander Joe/AFP via Getty Images)
Twenty-five year ago, news flashed across television screens that U.S. Troops had involved in several of the many intense city combat because Vietnam and also suffered much more dead and wounded in a issue of hours than recent years of to work combined.

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The fight of Mogadishu ~ above Oct. 3-4, 1993, in Somalia would later be viewed as a tactical success in which, despite daunting odds and also unforeseen mishaps, a pressure of about 100 Americans hosted off more than 1,000 opponent who poured streams of tiny arms and also rocket assaults in an intense, combination ambush.

U.S. Pressures had come in the war-torn country in 1992 top top a humanitarian mission to acquire food to starving civilization in a city where resources were controlled by miscellaneous warlords. One of those warlords, Gen. Muhammed Farah Aideed, had directed pressures that conducted strikes on U.N. Allies, death dozens, and also a battle in respectable 1993 that killed four U.S. Military police officers.

Those attacks readjusted the mission, called Operation Gothic Serpent, because that Task force Ranger to start focusing top top raids to record Aideed and his peak commanders. Those raids, initially the sort soldiers train because that routinely, erupted right into a crisis when militiamen downed two Black hawk helicopters utilizing rocket pushed grenades. The 15-hour battle that ensued left 18 american dead and 73 injured. And shocking images of American soldiers dragged with the streets of Mogadishu were seared right into the storage of many Americans in ~ home.

The publication by journalist mark Bowden and also later the movie “Black hawk Down” chronicled the fight in harrowing detail, memorializing it and contributing come its enduring heritage in both military and also civilian circles.


Though the military Rangers, Delta force operators, 10th Mountain department soldiers and other service members who took component in the fight would certainly be well-known for their heroism, the fight signaled the finish of procedure Restore hope in Somalia and also was defined by many as a strategic failure.

U.S. Pressures would go on to carry out multiple humanitarian and also peacekeeping objectives for the rest of the 1990s, yet military and civilian leader were cautious to protect against such intense combat and losses. The class learned through the distinct operations forces echoed into the post-9/11 era and continue to resonate come this day.

Lt. Gen. Fran Beaudette, head that U.S. Military Special operations Command, told military Times the the sacrifices and bravery the those who dealt with in Mogadishu are reminders the the “professionalism, cohesion and valor of ours forces.”


The wreckage the a jeep burns in a Mogadishu street Oct. 3, 1993, after that was ruined by a remote regulated bomb, injuring three U.S. Organization members. (AFP via GettyImages)

Beaudette was not in Mogadishu at the time but had submitted his special Forces an option package just prior to the battle and also recalled trying to piece together what had actually happened through friends and colleagues indigenous his standard infantry unit.

“The fight reinforced mine decision to sign up with , and I doubled under on mine training and prep,” Beaudette said.

He would certainly later benefit from others" experience from that battle when he landed on his operation Detachment-Alpha team and met his team sergeant, rick Lamb, a Mogadishu veteran.

The three-star referred to as Lamb “one of the finest leaders” he’d ever before served v in his career.

The current commander that the 75th Ranger Regiment, Col. Brandon Tegtmeier, was a cadet at West allude during the operation. One of his instructors during Ranger assessment and selection was a veteran the the battle.

A quarter century later, the heroism and bravery of the guys who battled that battle continue to inspire existing troops and Tegtmeier said today’s rangers “strive to emulate them.”

Tegtmeier echoed rather in how the great learned indigenous the fight only serve to reinforce the fundamentals of combat training. But, he included that it also underscores the importance of structure interoperability in between forces prior to the fight.

And past the standard warfighting skills, Mogadishu emphasized the prominence of the human terrain and the challenges of the counterinsurgency mission, he said.

After 9/11, together the global War top top Terror unfolded nearly a te later, numerous Mogadishu veterans to be in vital positions of leadership in the ranks.

“They hammered house to united state the criticality of being comprehensively ready, just how being an professional in the basics to be fundamental, and also how personal and expert discipline, particularly in combat with our native partners, was paramount come success,” Beaudette said.

Individuals interviewed, and also multiple instance studies of the battle repeat that exact same takeaway — reality training and also repetition come the allude of mastery were crucial.

“The Ranger Regiment’s capacity to find out from the tactical class of Mogadishu was absolutely critical in preparing us for combat in Afghanistan and also Iraq, an especially in the early years of the conflicts,” Tegtmeier said.

Command Sgt. Maj. Reese Teakell to be still a teenager once he deployed with third Ranger Battalion come Somalia. Some of his noncommissioned officers had combat experience from work in Grenada or Panama, but many had actually never seen a firefight. Yet they had actually all been lugged up by the Vietnam generation, who drilled into them the importance of rigorous training.

“There to be a warrant officer who told me this: the said, ‘Hey, make certain you’re all set to go. Nobody boosts in a firefight. You enter the firefight v the skill and knowledge did you do it trained with," ” Teakell said. “Don’t use the time you need to prepare lightly.”

It’s basic for present soldiers to watch the previous two years of near-constant deployments as the norm. However for troops native the late 1970s till the late 1990s, yes, really combat operations were rare and brief.


A U.S. Black color Hawk helicopter with U.S. Troops in Mogadishu, Somalia, Sept. 2, 1993. (Alexander Joe/AFP via Getty Images)

Retired military Maj. Larry Moores at the moment counted himself lucky ― or unlucky, if friend asked his mother, he said.

He had deployed come Grenada but missed Panama because he remained in Officer Candidate School. He later on deployed come Somalia, Haiti and then Afghanistan prior to retiring.

A year ~ Somalia, his unit, Bravo Company, third Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, was among the couple of with combat endure to share through troops then headed come Haiti.

Though numerous of the fundamental skills remained the same, some training and also operational tactics changed immediately.

Moores provided that because that both Haiti and also later Afghanistan, rangers flew into locations from ships offshore because that raids rather than creating ground bases in or near big cities, such as in Mogadishu.

A 2002 document on Mogadishu through Maj. Christopher Forbes in ~ the U.S. Military Command and also General employee College, titled “In order come win, learn exactly how to fight: the U.S. Army in city Operations,” provided that great learned had focus on marksmanship, physics fitness, fight drills and medical training.

After Mogadishu, rangers added an ext close-quarters combat training to their marksmanship drills and also strove to have actually every Ranger certified as a combat lifesaver due to the fact that the ratio of troops come medics was 48-to-1.


American and U.N. Soldiers patrol Oct. 13, 1993, in southern Mogadishu, Somalia. (Hocine Zaourar/AFP via Getty Images)

They also found troubles with planning for contingencies. The Mogadishu raid was expected to be a one- or two-hour operation, so many soldiers brought only a simple ammunition load, no night vision goggles and one canteen of water.

Even commonly trained methods such as “stacking and moving” along walls in the metropolitan area confirmed “extremely perilous,” Forbes wrote.

That compelled later transforms in dismounted movement.

A bigger tactical shortfall, though, was more due come operational or even strategic miscalculations. The Rangers had no armored vehicles, and also even your Humvees lacked firepower past .50-caliber device guns. They had actually no grenade launchers, and due to the civilian-packed city terrain, fire assistance was limited to close-air assistance from helicopters.

The occasionally direct link pf just how tactical events unfold and also the bigger strategic aims continues this particular day with Ranger organization in Afghanistan, Tegtmeier said.

High level plans lacked thorough analysis, detailed another study out the the Combat researches Institute Press, titled “Understanding the ‘Victory Disease’ indigenous the battle of small Bighorn come Mogadishu and Beyond,” by Maj. Timothy Karcher.

Karcher points out that Task force Ranger had six times carried out missions using comparable tactics to those used in the battle of Mogadishu before the incident. That developed a pattern that foe forces might recognize and also exploit.

“If you usage one tactic twice, you must not usage it a 3rd time, and also the Americans currently had done basically the very same thing six times,” a Somali militia command told the Washington short article after the battle.


Three homeward tied U.S. Army Rangers lug their bags and M-16 rifles toward a army transport airplane at Mogadishu worldwide airport Oct. 21, 1993, for the withdrawal from Somalia. (Hocine Zaourar/AFP via Getty Images)

Even come date, just a grasp of battles end the past two years even come nearby to equivalent the sustained intensity of the 15-hour hit in Mogadishu.

Most enemy call in recent years has been v improvised explosive machine attacks or short-lived ambushes that last minutes prior to adversaries retreat.

Teakell points out that Mogadishu was an ambush the went “on because that hours.”

In those situations, the defending force is designed come lose.

But the wasn’t the situation in Mogadishu.

“The circumstances were seemingly to the enemy’s benefit,” Teakell said. “We not only combated through it, we stayed to take care of our people.”

He to be shoved right into the driver’s chair in his automobile convoy. A turret gunner to be killed beforehand in the ambush and also immediately changed by another soldier that was climate shot in the leg.

Those space lessons he still carries through him currently as the command sergeant significant for the third Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division.

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“What walk it take it to have a team that can not just survive that level the contact, but likewise persevere in it?” he said. “That’s a class for any formation, exactly how to construct a team with those kinds of people, soldiers, leaders.”

About Todd South

Todd South has actually written about crime, courts, government and the military for many publications due to the fact that 2004 and was called a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on angry intimidation. Todd is a naval veteran the the Iraq War.